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Abstract
The social complexity hypothesis asserts that animals living in large social groups should display enhanced cognitive abilities along predictable dimensions. To test this concept, we compared highly social pinyon jays, Gymnorhinus cyanocephalus,
with relatively nonsocial western scrub-jays, Aphelocoma californica, on two complex cognitive tasks relevant to the ability to
track and assess social relationships. Pinyon jays learned to track multiple dyadic relationships more rapidly and more accurately than scrub-jays and appeared to display a more robust and accurate mechanism of transitive inference. These results
provide a clear demonstration of the association between social complexity and cognition in animals.

A

nimals that live in large, stable social groups face
substantial cognitive demands. They must recognize
other individuals in their group, continuously track the
position, social behavior and foraging success of other individuals, classify group members by age, sex, genetic relationship, reproductive status and dominance rank, and
update this information as circumstances change (Cheney
& Seyfarth 1990). Given these demands, it has been hypothesized that highly social animals should show commensurate increases in cognitive abilities related to social
living (Kummer et al. 1997). Indeed, social complexity
may have provided the primary selective impetus for the
evolution of intelligence in primates (Jolly 1966; Humphrey 1976; Byrne & Whiten 1988).
The primary literature addressing this hypothesis
has focused on data from field studies of Old World primates, constructing evolutionary accounts of the functional significance of their cognitive abilities (reviewed
in Byrne & Whiten 1997). But these studies provide little
in the way of direct tests of the evolutionary hypothesis,
largely because comparable data from species differing
in sociality are difficult to obtain with field methodologies. There have also been very extensive experimental studies on the cognitive capabilities of animals (reviewed in Shettleworth 1998). But for the most part, the
tasks used have not been designed with regard to the
cognitive demands of social complexity, and the species
studied have not been selected with sociality in mind.
As a result, the social complexity hypothesis remains
relatively untested.

One promising approach to testing the social complexity hypothesis is to use controlled experimental techniques to compare cognitive abilities in closely related
species that differ strongly in their social organization
(Endler 1986; Kamil 1988). These need not be primates:
if the hypothesis is correct, enhanced cognitive abilities
should be apparent in any highly social vertebrate (Balda
et al. 1996; Holekamp et al. 1999). In this paper, we present the first explicit comparative test of the social complexity hypothesis conducted under well-controlled, experimental conditions, using two closely related species
of birds with contrasting degrees of sociality.
Pinyon jays, Gymnorhinus cyanocephalus, are probably
the most highly social North American corvids, living
in stable groups of 50–500 individuals, foraging as a permanent flock and breeding colonially (Marzluff & Balda
1992). In contrast, the typical social unit of closely related
western scrub-jays, Aphelocoma californica, is a pair of
birds and their young of the year (Madge & Burn 1994).
Although pinyon jays are more dependent on stored food
during winter, the two species are quite comparable in
most other aspects of their biology. They are sympatric
over large parts of Arizona and Colorado, U.S.A., using
similar resources (Madge & Burn 1994), and Aphelocoma
and Gymnorhinus appear to be the most closely related of
the six corvid genera endemic to the New World (Monteros & Cracraft 1997).
The social complexity hypothesis predicts that despite
the close degree of relatedness and substantial ecological
similarities between these species, the differing demands
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of their social lifestyles should have selected for differences in relevant cognitive abilities. To test this hypothesis, we explored a subset of the cognitive abilities that
social animals presumably use to track and assess relationships among group members. Understanding the
web of relationships within the group should, in the first
instance, require simultaneous tracking of a large number
of dyadic interactions. We would thus expect highly social animals to learn multiple dyadic relationships more
readily and be able to keep track of more of them. This
aspect of social cognition was tested in experiment 1.
Second, it seems unlikely that an individual in a large
social group could ever observe interactions between all
possible pairs of group members. Social animals must
base some of their relationship judgments on transitive
inferences, concluding that if A is dominant to B and B is
dominant to C, then A would probably also dominate C,
even if they have never seen A and C interact (Smith 1988;
Hogue et al. 1996). This suggests that social and nonsocial
species should differ in their ability to make transitive inferences. This aspect of social cognition was tested in experiment 2.
We tested scrub-jays and pinyon jays using well-established operant procedures, in which the ordering of a set
of arbitrary stimuli can be inferred from a series of dyadic
comparisons (Fersen et al. 1991; Treichler & van Tilburg
1996). In the first experiment, the birds were trained on
a series of discriminations between successive pairs of
seven colored stimuli, simultaneously tracking six dyadic
relationships. Species differences were assessed in terms
of the rate of task acquisition and asymptotic levels of
performance. In the second experiment, we tested both
species with novel stimulus pairs to analyze their transitive reasoning abilities.
General Methods
Subjects
Five scrub-jays and five pinyon jays were captured as
adults in live traps in Colorado and northern Arizona
and were subsequently housed in individual cages in environmentally controlled rooms (22°C; 14:10 h light:dark
cycle). They were maintained at 85–90% of their free-feeding weights by controlled feedings of turkey starter, sunflower seeds, parrot pellets, mealworms, pine nuts and a
vitamin supplement, and were given unlimited access to
grit and water. All subjects were initially naïve to operant
procedures but had previously been used in several different open-room tests of spatial orientation.
Apparatus
Experiments were conducted in operant boxes equipped
with three 2.5-cm diameter pecking keys spaced at 7.6cm intervals across the front wall of the chamber, 22.5 cm
above the floor. A perch was placed in front of the key
array and adjusted so that the centers of the keys were
approximately at eye level for each species. During trials, colored light from a computer monitor was projected
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on the keys from behind through diffusion filters. The
stimulus colors were red, green, blue, magenta, yellow,
cyan, orange, or white, drawn from the standard VGA
palette and chosen to be maximally discriminable to the
human eye. The chamber was diffusely lit, and ambient
white noise was provided to mask external sounds. Rewards were the most preferred food items for each species, pieces of pine nut for pinyon jays and halves of
mealworm for scrub-jays. These were delivered into a
food cup centered at floor level at the rear of the chamber,
turning on an adjacent ‘food light.’
Trial Sequence
At the start of each trial, the center key was illuminated in
white. If the key was not pecked within 15 seconds, it was
turned off, and the trial was reinitiated after a 3-second
delay. When the center key was pecked, it was turned off,
and both side keys were illuminated, presenting a choice
between two of the seven nonwhite colors. Upon three
successive pecks to one of the side keys, the entire panel
was darkened. If the correct key had been pecked, a reward was delivered. After 10 seconds, the food light was
turned off, and another trial began 20 seconds later. If the
wrong key was pecked, the next trial was presented after a 30-s delay. If the bird failed to peck either key three
times within 60 seconds, the panel was darkened, and the
trial was repeated after a 30-second delay.
Initial Training
The birds were first habituated to the chamber and then
shaped to peck the side keys when either was illuminated
in white. They were subsequently given 6 days of experience pecking the side keys for reward, 36 trials per day,
18 to each side in random order. The central white key
was then added for 6 days as an automatic precursor, and
the response requirement for the side keys was increased
to three pecks. After 6 days at this stage, responses to the
initial white key were made obligatory, and the birds
were transferred to experiment 1, which tested their ability to learn a set of dyadic relationships that defined an
implicit ordinal sequence.
Experiment 1
The ability to track dyadic relationships was assessed by
training each bird on a series of discriminations between
successive pairs of seven implicitly ordered colors. The
correct choice was defined by the particular pair of colors presented: choosing B was rewarded when B was presented with C, but not when B was presented with A. This
contextual aspect of the task was introduced gradually,
but all six pairs were ultimately fully intermixed within
sessions, requiring simultaneous tracking of six dyadic
relationships.
Methods
The seven nonwhite stimuli were assigned a unique ordering for each bird that was balanced across birds within spe-
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cies, ensuring that no adjacent pairing occurred more than
once and no stimulus occurred more than twice in the same
ordinal position. The design thus ensured that the relative
discriminabilities of the stimulus pairs could not confound
the main effects of stimulus order either between or within
species. For any given color pair, only responses to the
first, higher-ranked color were rewarded, so the series of
paired discriminations defined an implicit hierarchy: A > B
> C > D > E > F > G. Birds were given daily sessions of 36
trials, with the position of the correct stimulus randomized
between left and right keys on each trial.
In the first phase, all trials in a session consisted of a
single color pair. Thus, subjects were trained first on pair
A/B, then on B/C, then on C/D. When a bird reached a
criterion of 32 or more correct responses in each of three
successive sessions, it was advanced to the next pair. As
each bird completed the last pair (F/G), it was advanced
to the second phase, an equal mixture of two adjacent
color pairs (e.g. B/C and C/D).
While the first phase was essentially a partial reversal
task, the second phase entailed greater cognitive complexity, in that one of the three stimuli was present in
every trial, but whether responses to it were rewarded
depended on which other choice stimulus was present.
For example, when B/C and C/D were being presented,
C was correct when paired with D, but incorrect when
paired with B. When each subject reached criterion on a
set of three successive stimuli, testing with the next set
began. For example, criterial performance during a B/C
and C/D session would be followed the next day with a
session of C/D and D/E trials.
In the third phase, the birds were required to track all six
color pairs presented in equal numbers and in randomized
order each day. This task was continued for 100 sessions
for the pinyon jays. Because the scrub-jays did not appear
to reach asymptotic performance levels within 100 sessions,
they were given an additional 100 training sessions.
Results
Although the two species learned the first (A/B) pairing
at comparable rates (paired Student’s t test: t4.8 = _1.12,
NS), repeated measures analysis of variance (ANOVA)
on the results of the first phase of acquisition (Figure 1)
indicated that pinyon jays learned the remaining dyads
significantly faster than scrub-jays. The main effect of species was significant (ANOVA: F1,8 = 8.79, P < 0.02), as was
the effect of color pair (ANOVA: F5,40 = 5.05, P < 0.002),
presumably reflecting the greater error rates displayed
to the C/D and E/F pairs, but the species-by-pair interaction was not significant. During the second acquisition
phase, pinyon jays again required much less experience
than scrub-jays to reach criterion (Figure 2). Pinyon jays
averaged 266 trials to criterion per triad, while scrub-jays
needed 684 trials per triad to attain the same performance
level. Repeated measures ANOVA on the results of the
second phase showed a significant main effect of species
(ANOVA: F1,8 = 13.18, P < 0.01), but no significant effect
of triad and no significant interaction.

Figure 1. Acquisition of discriminative performance on single color
pairs. Data points indicate mean errors to criterial performance across
birds. Error bars bracket the pooled within-subjects standard error estimate for each species. ●: Pinyon jays; ▲: scrub-jays.

Figure 2. Acquisition of discriminative performance on mixtures of two
successive color pairs. Data points indicate mean errors to criterial performance across birds. Error bars bracket the pooled within-subjects
standard error estimate for each species. ●: Pinyon jays; ▲: scrub-jays.

At the beginning of the third phase, accuracy was comparable for the two species, and well above chance levels
(Figure 3). However, pinyon jays improved more rapidly
than scrub-jays and attained a higher asymptotic level of
performance. Repeated measures ANOVA on data from
the first 100 sessions, grouped into blocks of four consecutive days, showed a significant main effect of species
(ANOVA: F1,8 = 27.53, P < 0.001) and block (ANOVA:
F25,193 = 12.28, P < 0.0001), as well as a significant species
× block interaction (ANOVA: F25,193 = 3.56, P < 0.0001).
Asymptotic levels of performance still differed between
species, even after the scrub-jays had been given 100 sessions of additional training (paired Student’s t test: t7 =
3.74, P < 0.008).
Discussion
The two species differed strikingly in their performance on
this implicit ranking task, indicating a consistent species
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formance. Although methodological differences make
comparisons to other studies difficult, the acquisition
performance of scrub-jays on the implicit sequence task
appeared to be significantly better than that of pigeons,
Columba livia (Fersen et al. 1991), while that of pinyon jays
was similar to but somewhat slower than that of rhesus
macaques, Macaca mulatta (Treichler & van Tilburg 1996).
Experiment 2

Figure 3. Acquisition of discriminative performance on mixtures of
six successive color pairs. Each data point indicates the mean accuracy
across birds for a contiguous block of four 36-trial sessions. Error bars
bracket the pooled within-subjects standard error estimate for each
species. Circles are data from pinyon jays; triangles are data from scrubjays. Filled symbols plot progress over the initial 100 sessions of training;
open symbols indicate performance after the scrub-jays had been given
an additional 100 training sessions.

difference in cognitive ability. Pinyon jays learned the dyadic relationships more rapidly, with fewer errors, and
reached a higher asymptotic level of performance than
scrub-jays. Moreover, the pattern of errors during acquisition clearly differed between the species. In the first
phase (Figure 1), learning the initial A/B pair was an acquisition problem, which the two species solved equally
well. Subsequent pairings involved a partial reversal, in
that the rewarded item was previously incorrect, and pinyon jay error rates were significantly lower, particularly
for the C/D and E/F combinations. This pattern suggests
that pinyon jays adapt more readily to reversals of previous reward outcomes.
A similar effect was apparent during the second phase,
learning pairs of dyads (Figure 2). The conspicuous peak in
errors to criterion for scrub-jays on the C/D, D/E treatment
was wholly absent for pinyon jays. Training on the C/D,
D/E triad, unlike earlier stages of this phase, involved simultaneous reversals or partial reversals for all three choice
stimuli. This again suggests that interference from prior reward history was more problematic for scrub-jays.
When the task was expanded to include all six color
pairs in every session (Figure 3), both species began at
a similar level, well above chance. But while the pinyon
jays rapidly improved, the scrub-jays had a great deal of
difficulty responding accurately when all six dyads were
presented in each session. While pinyon jays reached 80%
correct on all pairs in an average of 68 sessions, only four
of five scrub-jays managed to reach 75% correct even after
200 sessions. It is unlikely that these differences were due
to some methodological detail that favored the pinyon
jays, as there were no initial species differences in any of
the three training phases. In an earlier operant study of
color non-matching-to-sample (Olson et al. 1995), scrubjays took longer to learn the task than pinyon jays, but
they ultimately reached similar asymptotic levels of per-

In this experiment, we tested for transitive inference by
presenting occasional probe trials of novel, nonadjacent
color pairs intermixed among familiar stimulus combinations. Although the birds had had previous experience with both B and D, for example, these stimuli had
never been presented as alternative choices on the same
trial. A consistent choice of B in this novel pairing would,
therefore, indicate a transitive inference from the implicit
ordinal sequence. A frequently cited indication of successful transitive reasoning is the symbolic distance effect (Moyer & Bayer 1976), an increase in the accuracy of
transitive choices as the distance between items along the
implicit sequence increases (i.e. B/E is responded to more
accurately than B/D; Bryant & Trabasso 1971; Fersen et
al. 1991; Steirn et al. 1995).
The literature suggests that transitive responding during testing with novel pairs may differ depending on how
the implicit ordinal sequence is represented in memory. In
an ‘associative’ (Terrace & McGonigle 1994) representation,
the animal chooses between stimuli based on their relative
associative strength. Associative strength accrues gradually during training, over many trials, through direct or
indirect association with reward. Several algebraic models
of this cognitive mechanism have been proposed (Fersen
et al. 1991; Delius & Siemann 1998; Zentall & Sherburne
1998). The models differ substantially in detail, but when
we evaluated each of them across a range of potential parameter values, we found that they generally produced
higher associative strength at the beginning of an implicit
sequence and greater variance in strength at the end.
This implies that using an associative representational
system will yield transitive responding, but that error
rates will be higher at the end of the implicit sequence.
Associative representation, thus, should be characterized
by a ‘first-item accuracy effect’ (Fersen et al. 1991), a decline in performance as a function of the position in the
implicit sequence of the higher-ranked member of a dyad
(i.e. B/C is responded to more accurately than C/D or D/
E). Such first-item effects have been found in a number
of studies with pigeons, which appear to form associative representations of sequentially presented color dyads
(Fersen et al. 1991; Steirn et al. 1995; Wynne 1997; Delius
& Siemann 1998).
In a ‘relational’ (D’Amato 1991) or ‘linear’ (D’Amato &
Columbo 1990) representation, in contrast, the animal interprets the outcomes of individual stimulus pairings as
reflections of an underlying linear or spatial array and associates particular stimuli directly with their ordinal positions in the array. Animals using this system should show
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minimal first-item accuracy effects. However, if determining relative position involves counting down from the top
of the sequence, relational representations will produce
longer choice latencies for items late in the list, a first-item
effect on response times. Such latency effects have been
reported in both humans and capuchin monkeys, Cebus
apella (D’Amato & Columbo 1988, 1990; D’Amato 1991).
Distinguishing between these two representational systems was the primary focus of experiment 2.
Methods
The same subjects, apparatus and trial contingencies were
used as in experiment 1, with the exception of the inclusion of probe trials of nonadjacent pairs. For transitive inference testing, the birds were given 40 daily sessions of
36 trials each. During each session, they were presented
with familiar, adjacent pairs on 33 trials and novel, nonadjacent pairs on three probe trials. The 120 probe trials
presented to each bird included 20 of each of the central,
nonadjacent pairs in the implicit sequence (B/D, B/E, B/
F, C/E, C/F and D/F). We did not test pairs including A
or G, because responses to A had always been rewarded
and those to G never rewarded during training (the ‘endanchor effect’: Bryant & Trabasso 1971). To avoid biasing
choice on subsequent presentations, all choices during
probe trials were rewarded (Steirn et al. 1995). Otherwise,
the same reinforcement contingencies were used. All of
the pinyon jays completed the transitive inference tests,
but one of the scrub-jays had to be removed from the experiment for health reasons.
Results
Both species showed significantly higher accuracy on nonadjacent probe trials than expected by chance. For pinyon
jays, the proportion of correct choices on transitive inference trials was 0.86 (paired Student’s t test: t4 = 17.27, P <
0.001); for scrub-jays, it was 0.77 (t3 = 3.98, P < 0.03). The
species difference was not significant (t7 = 1.45, NS).
Analysis of the symbolic distance effect also indicated
that pinyon jays and scrub-jays were equally capable of
making transitive inferences. Because longer symbolic
distances are inevitably associated with higher-ranking
first items in a linear array, symbolic distance is fully confounded with first-item effects when all possible pairs are
included in the analysis (as in Fersen et al. 1991). To avoid
such problems in interpretation, we analyzed for symbolic distance effects separately in stimulus pairs involving the second-ranked item (B/C, B/D, B/E and B/F) and
in those involving the third-ranked item (C/D, C/E and
C/F).
Repeated measures ANOVA revealed a significant
main effect of symbolic distance in scrub-jays (ANOVA:
F3,9 = 4.05, P < 0.05) but not in pinyon jays (ANOVA: F3,12
= 1.38, NS) for pairs involving the second-ranked item
(Figure 4a). The pinyon jays may simply have reached a
performance ceiling, as two of them made no errors for
any nonadjacent stimulus pairs in this data set. The results
for pairs involving the third-ranked item showed a similar

Figure 4. Performance accuracy of pinyon jays (●) and scrub-jays (▲)
during transitive inference testing, analyzed for symbolic distance effects.
(a) Mean accuracy across subjects within species is plotted for color
pairs at successively greater distances on the implicit sequence, using
only stimulus pairs that included the second-ranked item. (b) Mean accuracy across subjects is plotted for stimulus pairs including the thirdranked item. In each case, error bars bracket the pooled within-subjects
standard error estimate for each species.

tendency (Figure 4b), but the effect was not significant in
either species (ANOVA: pinyon jays: F2,8 = 1.50; scrubjays: F2,6 = 0.97, both NS), owing to both higher variance
and fewer degrees of freedom for this comparison.
In contrast, the position of stimuli in the implicit sequence had substantially different effects in the two species, differences that were evident in performance on
trials with both familiar, adjacent pairs and novel, nonadjacent pairs. Our analysis of first-item effects in adjacent
stimulus pairs, excluding the terminal dyads, compared
pairs B/C, C/D, D/E and E/F. Analysis of nonadjacent
pairs used dyads that were two steps apart on the implicit ranking scale (B/D, C/E and D/F). As there were
large between-species differences in variance, these and
subsequent analyses were carried out separately within
each species.
For adjacent stimulus pairs (Figure 5a), there was a
strong, significant first-item effect on choice accuracy in
scrub-jays (ANOVA: F3,9 = 8.64, P < 0.006), but not in pinyon jays (ANOVA: F3,12 < 1, NS). In the most extreme case,
a scrub-jay that showed 92% accuracy in responding to
B/C dropped to well below chance (37%) for E/F. Pinyon
jay performance, in contrast, was almost invariably above
70% correct for all individuals and all stimulus pairs. Accuracy analysis for nonadjacent probe trials yielded a
similar pattern. Response accuracy declined across firstitem rankings for scrub-jays (Figure 5b; ANOVA: F2,6 =
4.97, P = 0.05), but not for pinyon jays (ANOVA: F2,8 =
2.17, NS). (The apparent decline in performance for pinyon jays (Figure 5b) was the result of a single subject that
had anomalously low accuracies in responding to D/F
probes.)
We then analyzed the effects of sequential position on
response time to adjacent color pairs (Figure 6a). Both
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Figure 5. Performance accuracy of pinyon jays (●) and scrub-jays (▲)
during transitive inference testing, analyzed for first-item effects. (a)
Mean accuracy across subjects within species is plotted for adjacent
stimuli in which the rank of the higher-ranked member of the pair decreases from left to right along the abscissa. (b) Mean accuracy across
subjects is similarly plotted for probe trials two steps apart. In each case,
error bars bracket the pooled within-subjects standard error estimate
for each species.

Figure 6. Mean response time of pinyon jays (●) and scrub-jays (▲)
during transitive inference testing, analyzed for first-item effects. (a) Response time across subjects within species is plotted for adjacent stimuli
in which the rank of the higher-ranked member of the pair decreases
from left to right along the abscissa. (b) Response time across subjects
is similarly plotted for probe trials two steps apart. In each case, error
bars bracket the pooled within-subjects standard error estimate for
each species.

species responded more slowly to adjacent pairs near the
end of the sequence (ANOVA: pinyon jays: F3,12 = 6.91, P
< 0.006; scrub-jays: F3,9 = 5.35, P < 0.025). But the mean response time for pinyon jays was significantly longer than
that for scrub-jays for the last two dyads (D/E and E/F;
paired Student’s t test: t7_2.86, P < 0.03). The same pattern
was observed during nonadjacent probe trials (Figure 6b),
where response time increased as a function of sequential
position for pinyon jays (ANOVA: F2,8 = 17.15, P < 0.002),
but not for scrub-jays (F2,6 = 1.71, NS).

experience with individual pairs. In contrast, when a relational representation is constructed, the results of individual trials are inserted into a pre-existing structure,
potentially requiring a smaller number of trials to attain
competent performance. That pinyon jays learned the
original set of dyadic discriminations with fewer errors
and reached a higher asymptotic level of performance is,
thus, consistent with the interpretation that the two species were using different cognitive mechanisms.
This finding is open to further exploration through additional experiments testing for species differences in list
linkage. Treichler & van Tilburg (1996) trained macaques
on two separate transitive series (e.g. A > B, B > C, C > D,
D > E versus F > G, G > H, H > I, I > J), then linked the
two series together by training the last item of the first series with the first item of the second (E > F or J > A). The
monkeys were subsequently able to choose accurately between pairs drawn from across the two lists. Our interpretation of the results of experiment 2 predicts that pinyon jays would show much greater between-list accuracy
in such an experiment than would scrub-jays.

Discussion
Both scrub-jays and pinyon jays showed high accuracy in
novel, nonadjacent probe trials, demonstrating an ability
to make transitive inferences. There were, however, striking differences in their patterns of responding as a function of the position of the stimulus pair in the implicit
ordinal sequence. Pinyon jays showed no effect of position of the highest-ranked stimulus in the pair on choice
accuracy, but were slower in responding to pairs that
were lower in the sequence. Scrub-jays showed a clear
first-item effect on accuracy, but only minimal effects on
latency. This suggests that the species used different cognitive methods for representing the implicit stimulus sequence. Relational models predict effects on latency but
not accuracy, the pattern shown by pinyon jays. Associative models predict effects on accuracy but not latency,
the pattern shown by scrub-jays.
This conclusion is given added weight by the species
differences in acquisition during experiment 1. When an
associative representation is being established, the change
in associative strength produced by each trial tends to
be small. Accurate sequential categorization using an associative mechanism may, therefore, require prolonged

General Discussion
The results of both experiments are fully consistent with
the social complexity hypothesis. Pinyon jays learned
multiple dyadic relationships that defined an implicit ordinal sequence more rapidly than scrub-jays and attained
higher asymptotic levels of choice accuracy. They also appeared to use a more sophisticated cognitive representation of the sequence, one that was less vulnerable to error. Because pinyon jays live in very large, stable social
groups, their ability to infer the dominance status of other
individuals is critically dependent on being able to make
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accurate transitive inferences. Social complexity thus entails a predisposition to interpret dyadic contrasts as direct evidence of an underlying ordinal sequence, a linear
representation of stimulus relationships that facilitates
tracking a large number of dyads simultaneously and increases the accuracy of inferences about the relationship
between novel items. Less social species, such as scrubjays, can also make transitive inferences, but their capabilities are more limited, since they have not been subject
to the same regimen of directional selection (Delius &
Siemann 1998). Relatively nonsocial animals may require
more extensive training, and the resulting cognitive structure produces less accurate transitive inferences, particularly in the later portions of the sequence. The ontogeny
of these cognitive structures would certainly be well
worth exploring. Pinyon jays mature in a more complex
social environment than scrub-jays, and the concomitant
experiential differences may contribute to the observed
species differences in transitive inference in adult birds.
Tests with hand-raised birds could be used to address
this issue.
The primate literature provides tentative support for
our inference of an association between the mechanism
of transitive inference and social complexity. Monkeys
that live in structured, long-lasting social groups, such as
rhesus macaques (Treichler & van Tilburg 1996; Chen et
al. 1997) or capuchins (D’Amato & Columbo 1990) show
strong evidence of relational representation, including explicit encoding of ordinal position and high accuracy in
transitive inference across linked lists. In contrast, squirrel monkeys, Saimiri sciureus (Robinson & Janson 1987)
commonly live in large, fluid aggregations with little
fixed structure, and their transitive inference performance
is far less impressive and more suggestive of associative
encoding (McGonigle & Chalmers 1992; Harris & McGonigle 1994). The pattern of cognitive differences between
pinyon and scrub-jays may represent a more widespread
phenomenon than has previously been appreciated.
Because any given pair of species always differ along
more than one dimension, however, there are tenable alternative interpretations of the evolutionary significance
of the differences we observed. For example, several authors have suggested that relational representation may
be tied to spatial perception (D’Amato 1991; Davis 1992;
Terrace & McGonigle 1994), and there is evidence that
training rats with stimulus pairs in an invariant spatial
arrangement increases the probability of subsequent transitive choices (Roberts & Phelps 1994). Pinyon jays cache
large quantities of pine seeds during the late summer and
autumn for retrieval throughout the winter (Marzluff &
Balda 1992). Like other caching species, pinyon jays have
performed better on open-room tests of spatial cognition
than scrub-jays, which cache relatively little (Balda & Kamil 1989; Kamil et al. 1994). This suggests that the superior
performance of pinyon jays in these experiments could be
a reflection of the need to recall and evaluate locations of
dispersed food caches rather than a consequence of the
demands of social living.

These alternative hypotheses can be differentiated by
further comparative research, as they make contrasting
predictions about other species pairs. This is an example
of how comparative studies of behavioral evolution are
most powerful when used iteratively, applying similar
experimental techniques to multiple sets of carefully selected, related species (Felsenstein 1985; Endler 1986; Kamil 1988).
To test the social complexity hypothesis directly
against the alternative spatial hypothesis, for example,
one could compare Clark’s nutcrackers, Nucifraga columbiana, and European jackdaws, Corvus monedula, two related
Old World corvids. The jackdaws are highly social, while
nutcrackers are relatively solitary, but in this case the spatial cognition difference is reversed: solitary nutcrackers
make extensive use of caching and spatial memory (Balda
& Kamil 1989; Kamil et al. 1994; Olson et al. 1995), while
social jackdaws apparently do not cache at all (Simmons
1968; Henty 1975).
The inferior performance of scrub-jays on this task
also opens the question of possible compensatory abilities in other spheres. Are there cognitive tasks for which
we would predict that scrub-jays might actually do better than their more social counterparts? One possibility
derives from the fact that scrub-jays have a considerably
broader niche than pinyon jays, occurring in oak woodlands and savannahs, as well as in pinyon–juniper forest
(Bardwell et al. 2001). They also accept a broader range of
foodstuffs, including more food of animal origin (Madge
& Burn 1994). We might, thus, predict that scrub-jays
would show superiority in cognitive tests related to ecological generality, such as exploratory behavior (Haemig
1989), environmental sampling (Shettleworth et al. 1988),
or neophobia (Greenberg 1984, 1990). Clayton’s (Clayton
et al. 2001; Griffiths & Clayton 2001) studies of episodic
memory in scrub-jays also suggest that their generalist
ecology may require them to encode more information
about particular food-related events than a specialist species such as a pinyon jay or nutcracker.
The evolutionary origin of human intellectual capabilities is one of the most challenging issues in behavioral
biology. Often, the question is treated as one that can be
approached only through observational studies of higher
primates. But some of the factors leading to the evolution
of human intelligence must be general, having effects on
the cognitive abilities and organization of other vertebrate
species. The experiments and results reported here demonstrate the possibility of testing hypotheses about the
evolution of intellectual abilities with nonprimate species.
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